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QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
Can we import improvements from industry to 
healthcare?
Healthcare has more to learn from other industries, including aviation—but it’s more complex than 
we think argue Carl Macrae and Kevin Stewart
Exhortations to learn from other industries have been com-mon in the world of healthcare improvement since the inception of the discipline.1 These are not 
always helpful. Recounting oversimpli-
fied improvement examples from other 
industries (often aviation) can provoke 
considerable frustration and scepticism 
among clinicians exposed to the unique 
challenges and everyday complexities 
of trying to improve healthcare. Patients 
are not aeroplanes, and hospitals are not 
production lines. Nonetheless, many suc-
cessful efforts to improve the quality and 
safety of healthcare have taken inspiration 
from other industries. Here we re-examine 
some familiar exemplars from the aviation 
industry to show what is (still) to be learnt, 
even in areas that have made substantial 
improvements.
No simple solution
From simulation training2 to patient hando-
ver3 to structured communication4 to qual-
ity improvement itself,5 many healthcare 
improvement interventions have been 
adapted from industrial settings as diverse 
as civil aviation, nuclear power, and car 
manufacturing. Initially, learning from 
other industries seems to offer a simple 
shortcut to anyone trying to improve health-
care. Other industries have spent decades 
developing tools, methods, strategies, and 
techniques to improve quality and safety: 
why not just apply these in healthcare?
Of course, it  is not that simple. 
Translating and adapting improvement 
techniques to healthcare is hard and has 
had varied results. Some interventions, 
such as those aimed at reducing infections 
related to central venous catheters, have 
proved popular and successful6; others, 
such as incident reporting systems, have 
met with frustration and failure.7 Initial 
enthusiasm for oversimplified, large scale 
attempts to apply a new improvement 
technique often quickly gives way to 
confusion, complication, and criticism.8 9
D e s p i te  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a n d 
frustrations, looking to other industries for 
ideas and inspiration still has value, just as 
other industries are increasingly looking to 
learn from healthcare.10 But to do this well 
requires a more sophisticated approach 
centred on three principles.
Firstly, efforts to translate improvement 
strategies from one setting to another 
need to be based on a sophisticated 
understanding of  the contextual, 
practical, and structural differences (and 
similarities) between those settings.11 
Secondly, translational efforts need to 
pay close attention to the cultural and 
organisational arrangements that support 
the particular improvement intervention. 
Thirdly, any translational effort needs to 
be based on a process of careful adaptation 
and intelligent reinvention, not simply 
importing and applying a readymade tool.
Lost in translation
Why is learning from other industries so 
hard? One of the main reasons is obvious: 
caring for patients is radically different 
from making cars or flying aeroplanes. 
Healthcare is unique in the intimacy, com-
plexity, and sensitivity of the services it 
provides as well as the trust, compassion, 
and empathy that underpin it.12 Healthcare 
is also enormously varied: elective surgery, 
community mental health, emergency med-
icine, and palliative care are very different 
in terms of the work, knowledge, and activi-
ties involved— and the ways they need to be 
organised and managed.
Healthcare is better understood as 
perhaps 20 different industries, many 
of which need to seamlessly interact at 
critical junctures throughout a patient’s 
journey.13 What works in one part of 
healthcare may not work in another. It is 
therefore unsurprising that what works 
in an entirely different industry, such as 
car manufacturing, may not easily and 
directly transfer to all healthcare settings. 
The diversity of healthcare means that it 
is almost meaningless to compare it with 
nuclear power or aviation.
Another rarely recognised consideration 
is that work in other industries is also 
diverse. In the healthcare literature, for 
example, “aviation” is often translated 
as “pilots flying aeroplanes”14—which 
overlooks the considerable differences 
between the operational work of flight 
crew, the diagnostic work of engineers, 
the physical repair work of maintenance 
technicians, the design work of system 
analysts, and the myriad other activities 
that constitute any complex industry. 
W h e n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  t r a n s f e r 
improvement lessons, it is important to 
understand the precise nature of the work 
in different healthcare settings as well as 
in other industries. For instance, it might 
be useful to draw parallels between the 
technical, process oriented, monitoring 
activities of anaesthesia and similar types 
of activities in the control rooms of nuclear 
power plants.10 Likewise, the complex 
diagnostic tasks, multiple handovers, 
and relatively isolated working patterns of 
maintenance engineering may be a useful 
analogue for some elements of primary 
care.
In addition, successful translation from 
other industries into healthcare typically 
depends on considerable adaptation and 
reinvention of the original improvement 
techniques. This can be seen in three areas 
KEY MESSAGES
•   Many of the improvement strategies, 
tools, and techniques in healthcare 
have been drawn from other indus-
tries 
•   When transferring improvement 
methods key elements are often 
missed, mistranslated, or inappropri-
ate to healthcare
•   It is important to understand the work 
context and organisational systems 
that underpin a method’s success
•   Better understanding of healthcare 
systems is also vital for successful 
translation
•   Other industries allocate consider-
able resources and dedicated staff to 
systems analysis and quality improve-
ment
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of healthcare improvement that have drawn 
heavily on techniques pioneered in other 
industries.
Incident investigation and analysis
Analysing and investigating adverse inci-
dents has been a cornerstone of improving 
patient safety for many years. The pioneer-
ing reports that established the discipline 
drew directly on the experience of other 
industries, primarily aviation,15 16 and inci-
dent reporting systems have subsequently 
become one of the most widely imple-
mented improvement strategies across 
modern healthcare. The English National 
Reporting and Learning System currently 
collects data on over two million incident 
reports each year17 and root cause analysis 
techniques have been widely adopted.8
However, the translation of these 
approaches into healthcare has often 
missed or misconstrued some of the 
most important elements seen in other 
industries. Incident investigations in 
industries such as nuclear power18 
are typically conducted by dedicated 
in-house teams of professionally trained 
investigators; routinely incorporate 
rigorous human factors and systems 
analysis; are separated entirely from 
any management processes that seek to 
allocate blame; and typically produce 
actions that focus on strong, systemic 
safety improvements such as redesigning 
equipment.
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l 
organisational systems and structures 
needed to  ef fect ively  learn from 
incident investigations remain relatively 
underdeveloped in many healthcare 
settings. Investigations can get tangled 
up with political processes of blame, 
there is limited expertise, and resulting 
improvement actions are not always 
robust.8 There has also been a heavy focus 
on collecting and recording large quantities 
of incidents. Reporting incidents has 
almost become an end in itself, whereas 
in other industries incidents are used 
merely as a starting point to investigate and 
improve work systems.19
Growing frustration7 has recently led 
to a reappraisal of the focus on reporting, 
with attention increasingly shifting back 
to the practical work of investigating and 
improving healthcare.20 21 Notably, several 
national healthcare systems are developing 
the capacity for routine, system-wide safety 
investigations (box 1).
Many healthcare organisations still have 
a long way to go before they can reliably 
transform incidents into improvements. 
Revisiting the organisational and cultural 
principles that support this in other 
industries still offers salient lessons, 
primarily the need for well resourced 
safety teams led by experts that allow 
systematic examination of practical work 
and the development of robust system level 
improvements in contexts removed from 
fear and blame.24
Checklists and cognitive aids
One of the highest profile improvement 
interventions adopted from other industries 
are safety checklists25 and other cognitive 
aids such as emergency manuals.26 Check-
lists provide a set of structured and practi-
cal instructions that either prompt, or serve 
to verify, a series of actions at key stages of 
a healthcare process—such as the sign-in 
process before surgery9 or during an anaes-
thetic emergency.26 Checklists draw directly 
on those used in other industries—aviation 
in particular—and the approach has been 
widely popularised.
However, in the process of being 
imported into healthcare, checklists 
have taken on several functions beyond 
those in other industries. For example, in 
healthcare checklists are often intended 
to prompt communication and facilitate 
team functioning. In other industries, 
the collective use of checklists depends 
on the prior creation of cohesive and well 
functioning teams through building stable 
cultural norms and expectations, routinely 
training for simulated emergencies, and 
establishing standard protocols for reliable 
communication,3 26 rather than aiming to 
create effective teams through the use of a 
checklist.9
In other industries, checklists are 
just one element of a carefully designed 
sociotechnical system built to support 
processes for high reliability and effective 
Box 1: System-wide, learning focused, safety investigation
What?
In April 2017 England became the first country to establish a dedicated, system-wide safety 
investigation organisation for healthcare: the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch. Norway 
is launching a similar organisation in 2019 (the National Investigation Board for the Health and 
Care Services), and other countries are exploring the idea.22
Why?
The objectives of these new organisations are translated directly from other industries, 
including railways, shipping, and aviation: to undertake rigorous, non-punitive, and systematic 
investigations into serious patient safety risks that span the healthcare system to develop 
system-wide recommendations for learning and improvement.21
How?
Uniquely, the organisations are independent of all other parts of the healthcare system. They 
can therefore investigate and issue recommendations to all parts of the healthcare system—
from frontline practice, to the design of equipment, to the regulation of services. Importantly, 
the investigation processes are focused solely on learning and are entirely separate from 
systems that seek to allocate blame, liability, or punishment. Information collected for the 
purposes of safety investigation will be used only for safety improvement and cannot be used 
by other organisations for punitive purposes. Ensuring this independence requires strong 
legislative protections to prevent safety information from being used inappropriately.23
What’s different in healthcare?
The principles of investigation are common across all industries, but the practical specifics will 
need to be reinvented to deal with the unique challenges of healthcare. In particular:
• Healthcare practices draw on cutting edge and ever changing medical science and so 
investigations will need to engage with scientific evidence and will probably need to regularly 
recommend further scientific inquiry
• Health systems are much more complex than any transport industry and encompass a wide 
range of highly specialised professional groups, skilled activities, and advanced technologies
• Healthcare investigations must sensitively engage patients and families throughout the 
process; they are often the only people who see the entire trajectory of care
• Healthcare organisations routinely capture few data relevant to safety—there are no “black 
box” flight data recorders as in aviation—and the data that are collected may be difficult to 
collate and are often qualitative
• Healthcare processes are less specified and less standardised than in other industries, 
meaning there may be few benchmarks against which to identify deviation
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human performance. Some areas of 
healthcare, such as maternity care, have 
emulated this successfully.27 But in many 
healthcare settings the checklist may be 
the only element of an entire process that 
has been actively designed with reliability 
and safety in mind.9 This brings both risks 
and opportunities. One risk is that an 
over-reliance on checklists, coupled with 
unrealistic expectations regarding their 
application, leads to well meaning people 
with limited expertise developing cognitive 
aids that are poorly designed or ineffective 
and therefore distract more than they 
support.
Healthcare could learn further from the 
strategic use of cognitive aids and checklists 
as part of more integrated approaches 
to designing processes and improving 
reliability. For instance, considerable 
effort goes into supporting in-the-moment 
professional decision making by mapping 
out the complex conditions under which it 
is safe for an aircraft to depart and when it 
is not (box 2).
Quality improvement and systems design
Healthcare quality improvement owes its 
existence to other industries. Process re-
engineering and systems improvement 
tools such as lean production,29 plan-
do-study-act cycles,5 statistical process 
control,30 and failure modes and effects 
analysis31 have been imported into health-
care almost wholesale.
Many of these methods may seem simple5 
but are actually highly sophisticated 
and challenging techniques that require 
considerable expertise to implement well. 
Reviews suggest that they are not always 
consistently or effectively applied in 
healthcare.5 31 This might be partly because 
individuals and teams are not appropriately 
trained or experienced in the particular 
method.5 But more fundamentally, it points 
to the importance of having appropriate 
organisational systems, resources, and 
culture in place to support the systematic 
application of improvement methods.
One of the hidden assumptions that 
underpins many process improvement 
methods is that there are stable processes 
in place to improve. However, as the 
reliability of systems such as those for 
inpatient prescribing and theatre equipment 
availability has been found to be about 
80%,28 this can be a bold assumption. 
Activities in many areas of healthcare have 
often grown up organically over many years, 
so the most fundamental step in many 
healthcare improvement projects is often 
simply to design a process to begin with.
To date, the improvement approach 
in healthcare has largely focused on 
initiating large numbers of locally led 
improvement projects. This approach can 
work to optimise processes that already 
exist but is less suited to tackling the large, 
complex problems of system design.32 
Again, insights from other industries are 
still highly relevant to healthcare, such as 
the importance of systems engineering. 
One of the defining features of many 
industries is the importance of “systems 
integrators,” who oversee and coordinate 
the design of complex systems. In aviation, 
for example, major manufacturers—such 
as Boeing or Airbus—fulfil this function 
by designing the core of the aircraft, 
coordinating with all the component 
manufacturers (from engines to flight 
computers), designing the maintenance 
processes, and defining the procedures for 
operating and maintaining the aircraft—
even down to specifying that on certain 
types of twin engine aircraft on certain types 
of operations, the same engineer may not 
conduct the same maintenance task on both 
engines, in case the same error is made.
Healthcare has much to learn from other 
industries about integrating complex 
technical, operational, and organisational 
systems. Recent examples include the 
systems engineering work undertaken 
to integrate technologies, processes, and 
systems in intensive care units33 34 and 
efforts to apply safety case techniques from 
the nuclear and chemical process industries 
to analyse, map, and improve the reliability 
of health systems.35 There are likely be 
new lessons to learn from developments 
in user-led design36 and the organisation 
of resilient organisational systems.27 But 
above all, perhaps one of the most striking 
and fundamental lessons for healthcare is 
the extent to which other industries allocate 
considerable resources and dedicated staff to 
systems analysis and quality improvement.24
Box 2: Integrating systems analysis, decision making, and cognitive aids
What?
The routine operational decisions that are made in airlines that determine whether a 
commercial airliner is airworthy and safe to fly are governed by a minimum equipment list (MEL).
Why?
At any point in time, any aircraft is likely to have some equipment that is faulty or inoperable. 
The MEL can be more than 400 pages, mapping out the conditions and contingencies under 
which an aircraft is safe to fly and providing the basis for sophisticated professional judgments 
by engineers and flight crews regarding whether an aircraft is safe to operate or not. Essentially, 
the MEL maps out for most conceivable scenarios that “If this is broken then it is safe to fly if A 
and B are operational and you don’t do C.”
How?
The core requirements are determined by aviation regulators, documented by aircraft 
manufacturers, incorporated into airline operators’ procedures, and implemented by engineers 
and flight crew. MELs are highly systematised decision support tools that capture a deep body 
of technical knowledge and present it in a way that supports expert judgment and professional 
accountability. These sophisticated cognitive aids aim to support cautious and balanced 
decisions about risks: ensuring that airworthiness and safety are maintained at all times and 
core regulatory requirements are met, while avoiding unduly inconveniencing passengers or 
affecting airline revenues by removing serviceable aircraft from operation.
What’s different in healthcare?
The need to balance safety and productivity pressures, and to structure shared decision 
making, are common to many healthcare settings, but the specifics of how such an approach 
might be incorporated into healthcare would need detailed analysis:
• In which healthcare contexts might it be useful to develop more extensive, systems oriented 
cognitive aids equivalent to a MEL, and when might such tightly structured decision making 
be inappropriate or overly constraining?
• How might a healthcare equivalent of a MEL be designed and implemented in surgical settings 
given that around 20% of surgical procedures start with missing equipment,28 and what 
adaptations might be required for different types of surgical procedure?
• To what extend might the principle of deep standardisation that underpins MELs conflict 
with new efforts to standardise healthcare processes, such as the National Safety Standard 
for Invasive Procedures in England, which encourages considerable variation in the local 
development and implementation of procedures and checklists?
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QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
From translation to exploration
Learning from other industries is neither 
simple nor straightforward but it remains 
an important part of improving the quality 
and safety of healthcare. Adapting quality 
improvement tools from elsewhere requires 
a deep understanding of the mechanisms 
and systems that underpin an improvement 
technique in one industry; closely examin-
ing the context, practices, and challenges 
inherent in a particular setting in health-
care; and then carefully adapting and 
reinventing the improvement technique to 
work in healthcare. At the core, the process 
of learning from other industries is really 
a process of learning more about our own.
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